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SUBSTANTIVE AND REFLEXIVE ELEMENTS IN MODERN LAW
GUNTHER TEUBNER
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in a time of increasing disenchantment with 
-the goals, structures, and performance of the regula­
tory state. The political debate over "deregulation" 
is just one manifestation of a much broader reapprai­
sal of the systems of law and public organisation.
Recent debates in legal sociology mirror the more ge­
neral concern over the effects of welfare-regulatory 
intervention. Thus,scholars have explored the causes 
and effects of the "legalization" of various spheres 
of social life (see Voigt 198o) as well as the sources 
and implications of movements for delegalization and 
informal justice (see Abel 198o). Attention has been 
drawn to "alternative" forms of dispute processing, 
to systems which could replace adjudication through 
formal legal means with various types of mediation and 
conciliation (see Blankenburg et al. 198o).
Viewed historically, the present moment seems to re­
present an era in which society is reassessing its com­
mitment to purposive and positive law and to the bureau­
cratic and legal structures that are associated with 
it. The classical models of law and state which we 
inherited from the nineteenth century stressed what 
Max Weber called "formal rationality" (Rheinstein,
1954:61,3o1). A formal rational legal system creates 




























































































nal law relies on a specialized body of legal profes­
sionals who employ modes of reasoning developed with­
in the law for the resolution of conflict. With the 
coming of the welfare and regulatory state, greater 
stress has been placed on what Weber would have called 
the "substantive rationality" of law, i.e. the use of 
law as an instrument for purposive, goal-oriented in­
tervention (Rheinstein, 1 954 :63,3o3). As law in this 
sense is designed to achieve specific goals in con­
crete situations, it tends to be more general and open- 
ended, yet at the same time more particularistic, than 
classical formal law.
European scholars have called this trend away from for­
mality the "rematerialization" of the law (e.g. Brugge- 
meier 198o). They see the trends towards more open- 
ended forms of legal regulation and more goal-oriented, 
concrete and purposive intervention as an inherent part 
of the program of the welfare-regulatory state and a 
development that leads to the dissolution of formal ra­
tionality. For some at least, the "materialization" of 
the law seems to threaten important social values (see 
Voigt 198o). These trends may at the same time threaten 
individuality by weakening the protections which for­
mal law (at least in theory) provided against arbitra­
ry state action, while at the same time removing bar­
riers to bureaucratic intervention in collective do­





























































































Legal sociology in Europe and the United States has suc­
ceeded in giving us useful phenomenological accounts of 
the conflicting and contradictory tendencies in the 
current situation. But while we have become aware that 
there are movements towards legalization and shifts 
from formal to substantive modes of legal thought and 
practice, we have no way to say why this is occuring 
nor any guides toward predicting the likely outcome of 
the current crisis. Critics tell us that legalization 
can not deal with the complexity and particularity of 
modern conflicts and argue for '‘alternatives" to law 
- (see Blankenburg et, al. 198o) . But this criticism is met
I "by those who note that delegalization and informalism 
can, under current social conditions, reinforce rather 
than erode asymmetric power relations (Abel 198o). 
Observers of the "rematerialization of law" note the 
pernicious effects of this process, but are unable to 
answer critics like Kennedy who stress the impossibi­
lity of_ realizing the program of formal law (Kennedy 
1976). But what is bringing about this crisis? Is the 
debate over legalization and delegalization , form and 
substance, evidence of cyclical oscillations between 
arbitrary yet antagonistic principles of legal and so­
cial organisation? Or is the current crisis the reflec­
tion of more basic, underlying forces whose operation 
can be grasped and whose direction can be anticipated? 
Because most current analyses of the situation lack 
either a macro-social or a developmental grounding, 




























































































The purpose of this article is to outline an approach 
to change in law and society that would allow us to 
see the current situation as a "crisis" of legal and 
social evolution, and thus to situate the phenomeno­
logical accounts of legalization/delegalization and 
form/substance in a more comprehensive social theory. 
To do this, I shall draw on an older tradition in so­
cial thought about evolutionary theory of law and so­
ciety. While legal evolutionism has an ancient tradi­
tion, in past decades it has fallen in disrepute. Yet 
in recent years there has been something of a renais­
sance in evolutionary approaches to explaining changes 
in law and society, both in the United States and 
Europe”1 . I propose to work with these "neo-evolu- 
tionary" thoughts to provide a way of seeing the cur­
rent situation in context.
)The method I shall follow is to analyze the two lea­
ding German neo-evolutionary theories of law in socie­
ty, and to contrast these to the most recent American 
essay in neo-evolutionary legal thought. From this 
juxtaposition of different but overlapping approaches, 
I hope to identify a new "evolutionary" stage of law, 
which I call "reflexive law", and to give an account 
of the problem of transition from substantive law —  
which is the prevailing mode in our societies —  to 




























































































This analysis is clearly a preliminary and tentative 
approach. My goal is to show how an evolutionary 
account which avoids the shortcomings of prior evolu­
tionary models can be constructed to demonstrate the 
utility of such an account for preliminary appraisal 
of our current situation. But the social theory I 
build on is itself imcomplete, and my efforts to apply 
it to the current legal scene are at best partial and 
tentative. For this reason, the article concludes with 
an outline of a further program of research needed 
fully to develop and test the approach suggested here.
II. n e o-evoluti onary theories abo ut law
The most comprehensive efforts to develop a new evo­
lutionary approach to law are to be found in the work 
of Selznick and Nonet, in the US, and Jurgen Habermas 
and Niklas Luhmann in Germany. These three neo-evolu­
tionary accounts seek to identify differents "types" 
of law, show the progression from one type to another, 
and explain the processes of transition. Whilst there 
are substantial differences between them, all three of 
these theories are concerned with a common problem: 
the crisis of formal rationality. They treat formal 
rationality as the dominant feature of modern law (at 
least until recent times); assert that phenomena like 
the "rematerialization of law" are a manifestation of 





























































































To some degree all these approaches hark back to 
iMax Weber's formulation of the issues. Writing more 
than a half a century ago, Weber both described the 
system of formal rationality and suggested the pos­
sibilities for a "rematerialization of law". Weber 
set forth a typology which included both formal and 
substantive rationality (Rheinstein, 1954:61,3o1; 
Trubek, 1972:72o). He traced the sociological determi­
nants of the shift from primarily material attributes 
of action (ethically determined, eudaimonistic or uti­
litarian) to primarily formal attributes (conceptual­
ly abstract, precisely defined and procedural). In his 
account, formal rationality is sustained by a set of 
methodological rules (legal syllogism, rules of legal
interpretation) that guarantee uniformity and continu-
2ity of the legal system .
Max Weber pointed, however, to some antiformal tenden­
cies in modern legal development (Rheinstein, 1954:3o3) 
In contract law, for instance, these tendencies mani­
fested themselves in an "increasing particularization" 
of the law and growing legislative and judicial control 
of the material content of agreements. Weber interpre­
ted this as a renewed infusion into law of "ethical 
imperatives, utilitarian and other expedential rules, 
and politcal maxims" (Rheinstein, 1954:63), which in 
his view would endanger the formal rationality of law. 
"In any case, the juristic precision of judicial opi­




























































































mic, or ethical argument: were to take the place of 
legal concepts" (Rheinstein, 1954:32o).
While Weber thought these trends rather marginal as 
compared to the overriding process of formal ratio­
nalization, contemporary evolutionary theories seem
to attribute high significance to the "materializa-
3tion of formal law" . They search for process models 
that would explain the dissolution of formal rationa­
lity in terms of transformation, directionality and 
evolutionary potential. In fact, all these models do 
point to a new type of rationality toward which post­
modern law may be moving.
While the three leading neo-evolutionary theories have 
a common problematic and, to some degree, a common 
starting point, the approaches they take and the basis 
for their theories are very diverse. Selznick and 
Nonet (1978) present a developmental model with three 
evolutionary stages —  repressive, autonomous and re­
sponsive law. Responsive law, in this account, is the 
result of a crisis of legal formalism, out of which 
a new form of law emerges which combines purposive­
ness and participation (1978:78,95). In explaining 
the transition to responsive law, Selznick and Nonet 
stress internal developments within autonomous law 




























































































Luhmann and Habermas, on the other hand, ground their 
analyses in theories of evolution in societal struc­
tures and processes of legal and social co-variation. 
Luhmann, who follows the Parsonian - Durkheimian tra­
dition and is the leading German exponent of "systems 
theory", employs a three stage evolutionary scheme of 
society which distinguishes between (i) segmented, (ii) 
stratified and (iii) functionally differentiated socie­
ties (1977a). Luhmann applies an analysis of co-varia­
tion between legal and social structures (197oa:3; 
1972a:132; 1981a:45). That is, for each type of social 
organisation there is a corresponding type of legal or­
der. Following this analysis, Luhmann is able to iden­
tify the current crisis in law as being generated by 
the transition from a stratified to a functionally dif­
ferentiated society. This transition "demands" a para­
llel transition within law, so that the legal order 
can perform its functions within a differentiated so­
ciety and adopt principles appropriate to it. From this 
point of view, the current crisis in law results from 
the inadequacies of the system of positive law. What 
is needed is not more purposiveness and more partici­
pation in law but higher abstraction, functionalist 
perspective, and "self reflection" (1972b:325; 1974:49;
1 979 :1 76) .
Jurgen .Habermas approaches the same issue from a dif­
ferent vantage point (1975). The leading spokesman of 




























































































tion of historical materialism" along neo-evolutionary 
lines (1976). Like Luhmann, Habermas identifies evolu­
tionary stages in society and analyses the relation­
ship between these stages and moral-legal developments. 
Habermas's model develops stages of social organisa­
tional principles which arise out of the interaction
of structures of social labor and communicative inter- 
4action . In his model, law is presented as the insti­
tutional embodiment of a historical sequence of "ratio­
nality structures": preconventional, conventional, and 
postconventional'*.
What then, given the controversial nature of these 
models, are plausible features of an emerging post­
modern legal rationality? one way to deal with this 
question would be to relate the competing models to 
their respective theoretical background and to choose 
between them on grounds of theoretical "rightness", 
which would mean to open a new round in the perennial 
debate between "grand theories". We will, however, try 
a different approach. Consciously setting aside the 
great controversies between functionalism and critical 
theory, we will seek implicit agreements and tacit con­
vergences. The goal is to transform seemingly irrecon­
cilable standpoints into complementary perspectives, 
constructing an integrated model of legal evolution by 
decomposing the existing models into their elements and 
restructuring them in a different way. In this view, 



























































































tackle different aspects of the same problem. By means 
of mutual adaption —  which requires some re-interpre­
tation —  the differences can be reconciled in a com­
prehensive model.
In our case, Nonet and Selznick, in order to explain 
legal change, rely strongly on "internal" variables 
of the legal system, while Habermas as well as Luh- 
mann tend to stress "external" interrelations between 
legal and social structures. Thus, it might be fruit­
ful to combine "internal" and "external" variables in 
a model which seeks to explain their co-variation.
What follows for legal rationality, if we contrast the 
inherent developmental potentialities of the present 
legal system (Nonet and Selznick) with constraints and 
necessities of an emerging post-modern society (Haber­
mas and Luhmann)?
It is my view, that if we follow this method we shall 
be albe to identify an emerging kind of legal struc­
ture which I shall call "Reflexive Law". The develop­
ment of this concept arises from the effort to explain 
how the internal dynamics of legal development described 
by Selznick and Nonet is likely to work itself out in 
the environmet of societal transformation which form 
the basis of the theories developed by Habermas and 
Luhmann. The result is a concept which is similar to 
Selznick and Nonet's but at the same time differs from 



























































































The argument proceeds as follows. In section III, I 
will look more closely at Selznick and Nonet's con­
cept, What they describe as "responsive law" turns 
out, when analysed from a European perspective, to 
involve two separate and potentially contradictory
I
dimensions. Thus, while Selznick and Nonet see the 
growth of "responsive law" as a unidimensional move­
ment toward a more participatory and purposive system,
I shall show that their model actually incorporates 
two related but distinct trends in post-modern law, 
namely the move towards greater substantive rationa­
lity and the emergence of reflexive rationality.
Since it includes substantive and reflexive elements, 
"responsive law" turns out to be, on closer analysis, 
an amalgam of two different types of legal rationali­
ty. This discovery leads to the question of whether 
"responsive law" is a stable or plausible "stage" or 
merely a moment in a transitional situation.
This is really the central question in the paper. But 
one cannot answer it in terms of the evolutionary theo­
ry which Selznick and Nonet use themselves, since the 
only dynamic element in their evolutionary model is 
internal change in law. This means that it is neces­
sary to develop more complex models of legal and so­
cial evolution, in which changes in the legal system 
are explained in terms that include both, the inter­
nal dynamics of the legal order and the impact of so­
cial structural factors. I turn to this task in sec­



























































































mas and Luhmann to develop some basic principles of 
socio-legal evolutionary co-variation. This prelimi­
nary analysis suggests the importance of two such 
principles: I shall call these the principles of "so­
cial adequate complexity" and the "congruence of organi­
zational principles". The principle of socially ade­
quate complexity, derived from Luhmann, states that 
the legal order in post-modern societies must have 
mechanisms adequate to operate in a complex environment 
of functionally differentiated, semi-autonomous sub­
systems. The principle of congruence derived from
Habermas, states that the basic organising concepts ___
of the legal order of a society must be homologous 
with the organising principles of the society as a 
whole. Applied to the problem of post modern society, 
both principles lead to the conclusion that a post 
modern legal order must be oriented toward self-re­
flective processes within different sub-systems of 
society.
In section V, I apply these principles to the origi­
nal problem, namely analysing whether the amalgam of 
substantive and reflexive rationality contained in 
Selznick and Nonet's theory of responsive law is a 
stable or merely transitory stage. This analysis leads 
me to conclude that the two strands of the amalgam 
have different probabilities of realization in the 
conditions of post modern society. It can be shown 




























































































likely to meet the requirements of the principles of 
socially adequate complexity and congruence of orga­
nization principle than are the purposive or substan­
tive aspects of responsive law. Therefore, I argue, 
even if responsive law accurately describes the cur­
rent situation in law, the amalgam it describes is 
unlikely to hold together. Moreover, a tentative case 
can be made that reflexive law, now just an element 
in a complicated mixture of legal orientation, may 
emerge as the dominant form of post modern law.
III. "TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW": INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF
i
LEGAL CHANGE
In order to understand the specific rationality of 
responsive law, it seems necessary to examine more 
closely how Nonet and Selznick connect their major 
thesis —  the transformation of legal formalism —  
with their method of a "social science strategy".
How does this strategy differ from traditional ju— 
jurisprudential and sociological approaches to law? 
What follows for the concept of legal change? And 
how is it related to the conceptual dimensions of 
legal responsiveness?
1. Social Science Strategy: Beyond Jurisprudential 
and Sociological Reductionism
Nonet and Selznick take up a whole range of jurispru­




























































































-  14 -
methods (1 978: 8; Selznick, 1 968:5o? 1 969:3). In their 
social science strategy they approach law in an empi­
rical rather than an exclusively analytical manner.
They define law not as unidimensional, but as multi­
dimensional. They include especially the social, the 
political and the institutional dimensions in particu­
lar and treat them as variables that depend on social 
context. Finally, they conceive these dimensions as 
forming a system of interrelated elements which can 
take on only a limited number of evolutionary configu­
rations. In this perspective, the theory of responsive 
law succeeds in going far beyond traditional juris-
tprudence. Legal development is not identified exclu­
sively with the unfolding of norms, principles, and 
basic concepts of law, Rather,' it is determined by the 
dynamic interplay of social forces, institutional con­
straints, organizational structures, and —  last but 
not least —  conceptual potentials.
On the other hand, this type of social science strate­
gy avoids the fallacies of sociological reductionism.
It is a common weakness of several sociological approa­
ches to law that they lose sight of the legal phenomena 
as such ^. This holds true for base/superstructure 
theories in which law appears only as an epiphenomenon
7disguising the genuine economic contradictions , as 
well as for positivist approaches in which law is re­
duced to a set of decisions determined by either power 



























































































roles, personal attitudes or a combination of these 
independent variables. In contrast, Nonet and Selz- 
nick view law as an autonomous social institution, 
the development of which is not a mere reflection of 
external social forces but of the internal dynamics 
of law itself.
Autonomy of legal evolution seems to be the striking fea­
ture of "Law and Society in transition". It is a theo­
ry of institutional constraint and response within the 
legal system whose "main point is that a determinate 
disposition to change is traced such that systematic 
forces set_in motion at one stage are said to produce 
characteristic outcomes at another" (Nonet and Selz- 
nick, 1 97 3:2o) . For instance, the very function of 
repressive law -- legitimation of power —  generates.. 
pressures within this type of legal system that under­
mine its specific structures; similarly, the emerging 
new type of law,autonomous law, develops internal 
modes of reasoning and participation that press for its 
own transformation into a more responsive type of law 
(1 978:51 ,71 ).
Thus, a "social science strategy", going beyond juris­
prudential as well as sociological reductionism, offers 
an alternative to traditional interpretations of legal 
change. Consider recent -trends of materialization 
of formal law. In the jurisprudential account, they are 



























































































equity and security of law (e.g. Radbruch, 1 965; 
Engisch, 1977; ch.VI). As a sociological phenomenon, 
the Marxist tradition interprets these trends as a 
superstructural reaction to the emergence of orga­
nized capitalism (Neumann, 1,967 :7) , while Weberian 
thinking relates it to the pressures of certain so­
cial interests (Rheinstein, 1954:3o3). In Selznick 
and Nonet's account, however, the legal system it­
self, in its formal stage of autonomous law, deve­
lops internally certain conceptual structures, methods 
of inquiry, institutional patterns and modes of par­
ticipation that systematically produce a different 
type of law, characterized by purposive thinking, so­
cial science methods, and political participation 
(1978:78,95,1o4).
Such an "institutional logic"/on which Nonet and 
Selznick insist, is strongly supported by their Euro­
pean counterparts. Habermas transforms "economistic" 
versions of the base/superstructure thesis into more 
abstract relations between "labor" and "interaction" 
and provides for an autonomous "developmental logic" 
of normative structures. Since the evolution of moral 
and legal consciousness follows its own autonomous 
pattern it cannot be reduced to a mere reflection of 
the "developmental dynamics" of the base social and 
economic structures (1979:13o).
It is one of Habermas' major theses that rationaliza­




























































































development take place, is independent from proces­
ses of increasing complexity of the economic and poli­
tical "system".
Luhmann accounts for the autonomy of legal evolution 
by defining it as an interaction between different 
evolutionary mechanisms inside the legal system. Its 
normative structures provide for variation; its pro­
cedural institutions fulfill the selection function; 
its conceptual abstractions represent stabilization 
mechanisms (197oa). Despite large differences in their 
respective models, which will be discussed later on, 
one finds a striking convergence in their view of the 
autonomy of legal evolution.
What does it mean to re-formulate legal change in terms 
of an autonomous development? Is this not a -sociologi­
cal concept of law which tends to isolate jurisprudence 
from the social sciences once again? Legal autonomy is 
not to be equated with autarky, since the legal system 
is not conceptualised as a "closed" system, as self- 
sufficient and independent from changes in the broader 
social environment. However, in sharp contrast to com­
peting socio-legal models, legal evolution is thought 
to be se If-programmed. Self-reference of legal struc­
tures is the key to the problem; law changes in reac-
gtion only to its own impulses . The legal order —  
norms, doctrines, institutions, organizations -- re­



























































































vironmental interests. The processes of institutional 
constraints and responses take place only between 
legal structures within the legal system, but this 
self-programmed change makes law responsive for ex­
ternal social exigencies. External changes are neither 
ignored, nor are they directly reflected according 
to a "stimulus-response-scheme". Rather, they are se­
lectively filtered into legal structures and adapted 
in accordance with the logic of normative development. 
Even the strongest social pressures are recognized 
only insofar as they appear on the internal screen of 
"legal constructions of social reality". Thus, broader 
social developments serve to "modulate" legal change 
which carries out its own developmental logic.
Self-reference, thus opens a perspective to legal de­
velopment in which the legal system appears at the 
same time as a "closed" system and as an "open" system. 
Autonomy of legal development and its dependency on 
social environment form neither a dichotomy nor the 
extreme poles on a continuum. Rather,both aspects 
appear to be compatible with one another and even 
variable against each other. Legal development is 
self-referential and at the same time "stimulated" by 
the social environment. While the first aspect -- 
autonomy -- is stressed in Nonet/Selznick1s theory, 
the second aspect —  dependency —  needs to be crit­



























































































- 1 9 -
It is the very concept of self-referential legal struc­
tures that enables us to take account of the "distinc­
tively legal" character of specific normative pheno­
mena, without at the same time losing a broader social- 
science perspective. We can sociologically recognize 
and analyse the differences between legal doctrines 
and scientific theories, between legal constructions 
of reality and social science constructs between 
"Rechtstatsachenforschung" and sociological empirical 
research, between a specific juridical type of ratio­
nality and that of other social subsystems. Most im­
portant for our context, the concept of self-referen­
tial legal development leads to a theory of post-mo­
dern law in which a new legal rationality appears as 
the product of an internal "institutional logic".
What then are the dimensions of rationality in "res­
ponsive law"?
2. Two Dimensions of Responsive Law: Substantive Versus 
Reflexive Rationality
While the contemporary discussion on materialization 
of formal law has revealed a variety of its aspects, 
Nonet and Selznick, with their core idea of autonomous 
legal change, present a coherent and systematic model 
of its consequences for the main elements of the legal 
system. Emerging from the internal crisis of legal 
formalism, "sovereignty of purpose" is the new sub­
stantive orientation which transforms fundamentally 




























































































dards and "result-oriented" rules. The new purposive 
orientation influences basic doctrinal concepts ("ob­
ligation and civility"), as well as legal construc­
tions of social reality ("political paradigm") (1 978: 
78,84,87,93). In this development, classical methods 
of legal inquiry need to transform themselves into 
methods of "social policy analysis", parallel to chan­
ges in the modes of legal participation ("legal plura­
lism" )(1 978:84,96,10 6) . Moreover, materialization of 
law corresponds to totally new institutional and orga­
nizational structures: it demands"regulation, not ad­
judication" carried out by non-hierarchical."post- 
bureaucratic organizations". Outside of the legal 
system, its boundaries need to be re-defined in res­
pect to the political and social environment: substan­
tive rationality requires an "integration of legal and 
moral judgment and of legal and political participa­
tion" (1 978: 1 o4,1o8 ,11o) .
However, one can detect elements in responsive law 
which cannot feasibly be associated with the emergence 
of a new substantive rationality. Although the authors 
themselves explicitly subsume them under "substantive 
justice" as opposed to "procedural fairness" in auto­
nomous law and to "raison d'etat" in repressive law 





























































































Consider their concept of "institutional design and 
institutional diagnosis" (1 978:1 1 1 ). Here, legal atten­
tion focuses on creating, shaping, correcting and re­
designing social institutions that function as self­
regulating systems. Legal norms are designed in order 
to produce a "harmonious fit" between institutional 
structures and social structures, rather than to in­
fluence the social structures themselves. Instead of 
substantive guidance of behavior, these norms are 
directed toward organization, procedure and competence. 
Instead of taking over responsibility for concrete 
social results, the law is restricted to regulate 
self-regulating mechanisms such as negotiation, decen­
tralization, planning, organized conflict. While sub­
stantive rationality would require a comprehensive re­
gulation, "institutional design" aims at "enablement 
and facilitation" (1978:111).
The same is to be said about features of responsive 
law. Politicization of law, for instance, as suggested 
by new modes of political participation (social ad­
vocacy, class action, representation of group inte­
rests, etc.) (1978:95), has the effect of importing a 
different set of social conflicts and of integrating 
different interests into the legal process. It does 
so without engaging in specific results, which a sub­
stantive rationality would require. Even the infusion 
of social science into legal doctrine may serve other 




























































































dated with social policy approaches (1978:84). Social 
science might turn out to be much more relevant to ab­
stract model-construction in law, to fundamental chan­
ges in the conceptual structures. This has not very 
much in common with the "scientific" production of 
material results which a substantive rationality would 
demand.
These considerations suggest a clear analytical dis­
tinction. There are two trends in the transformation 
of legal formalism. In responsive law, "formal" ratio­
nality is replaced by a new "substantive" rationality 
and a new "reflexive" rationality. This needs some 
conceptual clarification.
Legal rationality is a compact concept. In order to 
define the specific rationalities of formal, substan­
tive and reflexive law, we have to dissolve that com­
pactness by breaking up the concept into different 
dimensions. This can be done by using the dimensions 
of rationality. Habermas (1976:262) uses to analyse 
modern formal law and then applying the same dimen­
sions to substantive law and reflexive law. Habermas's
categories expand on the original Weberian concepts, 
which equated legal rationality with internal features, 
i.e. the construction of general conceptual categories 
and the systematization of doctrine. For Habermas this i 
only one dimension of legal rationality. This internal




























































































system rationality and norm rationality. System ratio­
nality refers to the external social functions of law: 
it designates the capacity of the legal order to res­
pond to control problems of society at large. Norm 
rationality, in contrast, refers to fundamental prin­
ciples which justify the specific way that legal norms 
should govern human actions. These three dimensions of 
legal rationality are connected to each other in a 
systematic fashion which we will discuss at length 
later on. Here for the purpose of conceptual clarifi- 
cation, it is sufficient to sketch the interrelation 
as follows: Developments in the moral-cultural sphere 
press for the emergence of a new norm-rationality. In­
sofar as developments in the social sphere create the 
need for a new system rationality of law, a new internal 
structure might develop as an "incorporation" of the 
new norm-rationality. If we apply this formal model to 
our analysis of modern law, we propose the following 
three dimensions: (1 ) justification of law ("norm ra­
tionality"); (2) external functions of law ("system 
rationality"); (3) internal structure of law ("inter­
nal rationality").
Formal rationality of modern law is then defined by a 
historically specific configuration of these three 
dimensions: (1) The justification of formal law is the
perfection of individualism and autonomy (Kennedy, 1 976) . 
Formality in this respect means that law is clearly 




























































































action for the autonomous pursuit of private interests. 
Formal law "defines scopes of legitimate arbitrariness 
of private actors" (Habermas, 1976:264) . Law guaran­
tees only a formal framework while the substantive 
value judgements are made by private actors. "Formali­
ties" facilitate private ordering, they are "premised 
on-the lawmaker's indifference as to which of a number 
of alternative relationships the parties decide to 
enter"(Kennedy, 1 97 6 : 1 685) . Formal law regulates nega­
tively by restricting principally accepted subjective 
rights, instead of a positive regulation via concrete 
duties and substantive prescriptions. Its corollary 
elements are: conventionality, legalism and universa- 
lism (Habermas, 1976:264). (2) With this orientation,
formal law fulfills specific external social functions. 
Formal law develops its own system rationality insofar 
as it establishes spheres for autonomous activity and 
fixed boundaries to the action of private actors. Thus 
it fulfills the normative imperatives of a developed 
market-society by contributing to the mobilization 
and allocation of natural resources (Habermas, 1976:
q264; 1981:352) . In the systematization of subjective
rights we find a "semantics of decentralization" which 
is the adequate legal form for the functional diffe­
rentiation of an autonomous economic system (Luhmann, 
1981:3o). (3) It is by the interplay of both these ele­
ments that we can explain the internal structure of for­
mal law. In this dimension, law is formally rational to 




























































































dards of analytical conceptuality, deductive stringen­
cy and rule-oriented reasoning (Habermas, 1976:263; 
1981:348). A highly developed rule-orientation is rea­
lized in precise definitions of factual situations of 
norms and their legal consequences. Professionaliza­
tion is an additional element: Legal experts apply 
universally formal-operational thinking to their pro­
fessional knowledge "lo.
We propose to apply this trichotomy of norm, external 
function and internal structure to substantive and re­
flexive rationality as well. Substantive rationality 
emerges in the processes of increasing state regula­
tion. It is commonly associated with the growth of the 
welfare state and state intervention in market struc­
tures  ̂. In these developments, law loses its formal 
characteristics in regard to all three dimensions. (1 ) 
In its"norm rationality”, substantive law shifts focus 
from autonomy to regulation. The justification of sub­
stantive law is to be found in collective regulation 
of economic and social activities and in compensation 
of inadequacies of the market. Thus, the law tends di­
rectly to regulate social behavior. Instead of defining 
spheres for autonomous private action, the legal order 
defines concrete duties and substantive prescriptions. 
At the same time, law loses its universalist orienta­
tion which abstracts sharply from social status, and 
shows a tendency toward particularism, i.e. a renewed 




























































































new internal justification, substantive law fulfills 
different external functions. It tends to be instru­
mental in state-induced modifications of market-deter­
mined patterns of behavior. Substantive law demon­
strates its"system rationality" by the contributions 
it offers to political interventions of the welfare 
state. Substantive law is instrumental as the politi­
cal system takes over responsibilities for defining 
goals, selecting normative means, prescribing concrete 
actions, and implementing programs. (3) Insofar as 
substantive law takes over this new function and deve­
lops a regulatory justification, it tends to alter its 
internal structures. The dominant rule-orientation of 
formal law is supplemented by an increasingly purpo­
sive orientation. Substantive law is realized through 
purposive programs and implemented through regulations, 
standards and principles. This development toward a 
purposive law has grave consequences for the concep­
tual construction of doctrinal legal systems. It is 
one of the most contested questions today to what de­
gree legal thinking and legal practice can cope with
1 2the cognitive consequences of consequentialism
Reflexive rationality, finally, represents a much less 
well-defined type of legal orientation, which is due 
to its incipient and inchoate status. It has emerged 
only recently in the crisis of the welfare state as 
a still undeveloped alternative to regressive tenden­




























































































with state-interventionist concepts the notion of legal 
activism intervening in social processes but it retreats 
from taking over full responsibility for substantive 
outcomes, (1) Its justification is neither to be found 
in the perfection of autonomy, nor in the collective 
regulation of behavior. Rather,reflexive law is justi­
fied by the coordination of recursively determined forms 
of social cooperation. In this "norm rationality", re­
flexive law shows, indeed, resemblance to liberal and 
neo-liberal concepts. By legally supporting social auto­
nomy, it relies on invisible-hand-mechanisms. But in 
contrast, it does not restrict itself to adapting to 
"natural social orders". Quite to the contrary, it 
searches for "regulated autonomy", it designs actively 
self-regulating "learning" social systems through norms 
of organization and procedure. In contrast to formal 
law, reflexive law does not accept "natural" subjective 
rights. Rather it attemts to steer human action by re­
defining and re-distributing property rights. (2) Thus, 
reflexive law performs different external social func­
tions to substantive law. The role of reflexive law 
is to structure and re-structure social systems, the 
procedures of internal discourse and their external co­
ordination with other social systems. In that respect, 
reflexive law shows elements of "system rationality" 
insofar as it facilitates integrative processes with­
in a functionally differentiated society. Instead of 
prescribing authoritatively ways and means of social 




























































































for a decentralized integration of society and it 
does so by supporting integrative mechanisms within 
autonomous social subsystems. (3) In its internal 
structures, reflexive law has to go beyond the al­
ternative of rule-orientation and purpose orien­
tation. Its "internal rationality" is represented 
neither by a system of precisely defined formal rules 
nor by the infusion of purpose-orientation through 
substantive standards. Instead, it tends to rely 
mainly on procedural norms which regulate processes, 
organization, the distribution of rights and compe­
tencies . A new procedural orientation can be ob­
served in different legal fields as an emerging al­
ternative to formal as well as to substantive ra­
tionality of law ^. This type of law has a tenden­
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Why "reflexive" rationality? The theoretical con­
text to which this term refers will be treated sys­
tematically in section V. Here, in order to defend 
the terminology, it might suffice to sketch out 
three dimensions. This type of law employs reflex­
ive mechanisms : instead of making substantive deci­
sions, the law decides about organizational and 
procedural premises of future decisions. It is charac 
terized by a specific legal self-restraint following 
reflexive processes in the legal system which con­
cern the capacity limits of the legal order. Final­
ly , its main concern is to facilitate refLLexive 
functions within autonomous social subsystems: in­
stead of proscribing ways and means of social inte­
gration it creates structural premises for a decen­
tralized integration of society.
To use again contract law as an example, each of 
these rationality types would suggest a distinct 
approach. Formal conditions of the "meeting of 
minds" characterize formal legal rationality. While 
a substantive approach tends to judicial and legis­
lative control of the material terms of contract, 
reflexive legal rationality would look to the pro­
cedural and organizational conditions of power 
equalization in the bargaining process and to con­
tractual mechanisms of "public responsibility" 
which would make the cooperative system sensitive 




























































































"External decentralization" might serve as a second 
example in which we can identify developmental chan­
ces for a reflexive law (Lehner, 1979:178; Gotthold, 
1982). The present discussion on the limits of the 
social state has again and again pointed to disfunc- 
tional consequences of "legalization". Materializa­
tion of law finds its limits in those sectors of life 
which in their internal structuring resist processes 
of monetarization and legalization. The neo-conser­
vative solutions are well-known: de-regulation, re­
formalization, privatization. The concept of "exter­
nal decentralization" has been developed as an alter-
lnative solution. "Public tasks" are delegated to 
semi-public or private institutions, however, they 
remain "public" in the sense that political respon­
sibility prevails. Examples for such external decen­
tralization can be found in the delegation to "neo- 
corporatist" mediation-systems, semi-public associa­
tions, local social organizations. The political res­
ponsibility is restricted to a legal framework, to 
the "constitution" of the organization, to rights 
of participation and to procedures of decision-ma­
king. The crucial point is a permanent public su­
pervision and revision of the institutional design.
If the results of those social learning processes 
turn out to have socially detrimental consequences 
political responsibility involves a re-definition 




























































































To be sure, Nonet and Selznick, in their concept of 
responsive law, discuss elements of both, reflexive 
as well as substantive rationality, without, however, 
sufficiently distinguishing between them in a sys­
tematic fashion. What makes this distinction relevant? 
One reason is that reflexive legal rationality would 
require institutional legal structures, cognitive mo­
dels of reality, and normative characteristics quite 
different from its substantive counterpart. More im­
portant is the second reason: the distinction is ne­
cessary to assess to what extent the potential of res­
ponsive law can be realized. This is because the theo­
retical notion of autonomous internal legal evolution, 
which we have described up to now as a major gain of 
Nonet and Selznick's social science strategy, may have 
been purchased at too high a price. The price may be 
that of losing sight of the systematical interplay bet­
ween legal and social evolutionary processes. If the 
attention focuses, instead, on co-variation, then we 
find a perspective in which we can develop our main 
thesis: Social developments outside the legal system 
limit drastically the potential of substantive law 
while they favor systematically the reflexive type 
of legal rationality. To put our thesis into the 
authors' conceptual framework: It is reflexive rather 
than substantive rationality that represents the "con- 
"conceptual readiness" of responsive law to take ad­
vantage of "opportunity structures" emerging in post­




























































































IV. "LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION" : EVOLUTION OF
LAW WITHOUT SOCIETY
1. A Model of Internal Growth
We now focus on the relation between legal and social 
structures in the development of law. In Nonet and 
Selznick's account, this relation appears as rather 
marginal. The "inner dynamics" are in the foreground; 
they set in motion systematic forces that produce 
characteristic configurations of the law (1978:2o), 
while "external" influences appear only as histori­
cal contingencies that might block or facilitate le-
)gal development (1978:21,23,115). To be sure, varia­
tions of the multidimensional legal institutions are 
said to be dependent on social context. But through­
out the analysis one can detect a systematic under­
estimation of society's external dynamics.
This criticism should not be understood to suggest that 
the authors underestimat the relative strength of so­
cial forces as compared with specifically legal for­
ces. This would imply a multi-factor model of legal evo­
lution in which legal and social factors appear as in­
dependent variables, and the consequential question 
would be how to analyze their relative weight. Such a 
trade-off between legal and social structures, however, 
would not take into account the fruitful concept of le­
gal autonomy. Rather, underestimation means that the 




























































































legal autonomy, fail to recombine it with an elaborate 
model of the interrelations between an autonomous le­
gal evolution and broader social developments. Obvious­
ly a systems approach is needed. There are, however, 
different ways of providing a satisfactory analysis of 
inter-systems relations.
In Nonet and Selznick's account, the relation between 
legal and social system can be described by a model of 
internal growth. The role of the social environment is 
restricted to aiding or speeding up independent legal 
developments. Due to its internal dynamics, the legal 
system gains a developmental potential which defines 
exclusively its pattern of growth and decay. In this 
respect, we seem to have law without society. Broader 
social structures are decisive only in regard to the 
degree to which they help to actualize legal potential. 
They only determine the stability of an evolutionary 
stage and the probability of progress or regression 
(1 978: 1 8,23,1 1 6) .
Such a growth model views the relation between law and 
society as rather minimal. It leaves open the question 
of what mechanisms provide for the social actualization 
of legal potential, and which analytical tools should 
be applied. Do we have to think of.social pressures 
being translated into legal developments in terms of 
a causal analysis? Or, is a means-end analysis more 




























































































use legal norms for social purposes? A third option 
would be a functionalist type of analysis which estab­
lishes a relationship between external functions and 
internal structures of the law.
More fundamentally, questions are to be raised about 
the extremely limited role of "external" social struc­
tures in this model. In the classical models of legal 
sociology, characteristics of legal development were 
seen as interdependent with specific levels of social 
evolution. For instance, Durkheim's "restitutive law" 
representing "organic solidarity" is intimately con-
i !nected to a new stage in social organization. Division
of labor replaces a segmented organization of society
and its corollaries, mechanic solidarity and repres- 
1 4sive law . Similary in May Weber's theory, formal 
legal rationality is closely related to processes of 
"rationalization" in the whole society, particularly 
in the economic and scientific sphere (Rheinstein, 
1954:61,3o1) It is plausible to reduce these in­
sights of systematic socio-legal interrelations —  as 
imperfect they ever might be —  to the notion of po­
tential and actualization? Moreover, can we formulate 
a developmental model for a specific subsystem of so­
ciety -- in our case, law -- without at the same time 
designing a theory of societal evolution?
A third set of questions must be raised in regard to 
Nonet and Sleznick's concept of developmental "crisis" 




























































































specific internal crises in repressive as well as in 
autonomous law refer to "system integration" in the 
sense that the respective legal structures allow for 
fewer possibilities than are necessary for the main­
tenance of the system (Habermas, 1975:1)? The authors' 
stress on "greater capacities for problem solving"^ on 
"the economy of power" and on the "precariousness of 
responsive law" (Nonet and Selznick, 1978:24,33,115) 
would aptly fit into a functionalist systems approach. 
On the other hand, the problems of both repressive 
and responsive law are viewed as legitimation crises, 
leading to problems of "social integration" and social 
identity and to the dissolution of social norms (Haber­
mas ,1975).Perhaps Nonet and Selznick are deliberately 
refusing to be forced into making such a clear cut 
distinction between social and system integration.
Their concept of crisis probably contains elements of 
both. But, since we cannot equate social integration 
with system integration, are we not compelled to clari­
fy at least the internal relations between rationali­
ty crises concerning the social-engineering capacities 
of the law, and legitimation crises concerning social 
identity and social norms?
Let us reconsider the crisis of formal legal rationali­
ty in Max Weber's sense. Is it a deficiency of abstract, 
general, and formal control mechanisms ^  , or is it a 
deficiency of legal formalism to take into account 




























































































tion of this question would have important consequen­
ces for the concept of responsive law. The challen­
ges to which responsive law responds could be analyzed 
more precisely in terms of either an "internal" legi­
timation crisis or an "external" rationality crisis 
of autonomous law. Obviously, the response themselves 
would also be different according to this distinction.
These three sets of questions are intended to go be­
yond a mere clarification of the model's assumptions. 
They are aimed at broadening the scope of the theory 
in a specific direction: shifting the focus of the 
argument from a theory of internal legal growth to 
one of socio-legal co-variation. It may be possible 
in this manner to preserve the classical goals of a 
comprehensive socio-legal analysis whilst at the same 
time viewing in the perspective of the "internal dy­
namics" of legal evolution which Nonet and Selznick 
have successfully analyzed in detail.
2. Alternatives: Co-Variation of Legal and Social 
Structures.
In order to clarify this point it would be useful to 
examine two important discussions of the co-variation 
of legal and social structures found in the work of 
Habermas and Luhmann respectively. Both authors 
take into account the autonomous nature of the de­




























































































at the same time systematically examine the relation­
ship between law and its social context.
Habermas argues that post-Darwinian theories of social 
evolution which rely on the interplay of evolutionary 
mechanisms (variation, selection, stabilization) can­
not account for the identity of societal stages of evo­
lution and for their learning potential, both of which 
can be analyzed only in terms of "social consciousness" 
(Habermas, 1976a:226). Consequently, Habermas contrasts 
the "developmental dynamics" of those evolutionary 
mechanisms with an autonomous "developmental logic" of 
normative structures (moral and legal consciousness) 
which are supposed to follow a rationally reconstruc- 
table pattern of evolutionary sequences. He uses mo­
dels of the moral development of the individual from 
the Piaget-Kohlberg tradition to study the development 
of social norms (Habermas, 1 979c:95) . The resulting 
"principles of social organization" form a logical se­
quence of "structured wholes" which are characterized 
by the common features of irreversibility, structured 
hierarchy, and directionality (Habermas, 1979a:98).
In Habermas' evolution theory, these highly abstract 
principles of organization of society —  which include 
legal institutions (Habermas, 1976c:266) —  designate 
the "learning niveau" of a given society (Habermas,
1 971 :2 7 o; 1 975:1 7 ; 1 976a:2oo; 1 976b:92; 1 976c:26o; 




























































































scope for variation of types of social integration 
(social identity, consensus on values) as well as for 
system integration (the capacity for control of a so­
ciety) . Principles of organization emerge as the re­
sult of a double learning process which can be ex­
plained —  according to Habermas —  by combining two 
models. A functionalist system/environment model can 
be fruitfully used to analyze the capacity of a cer­
tain principle of organization to deal with the sys­
tem problems of a given society. In the event of a 
crisis, however, i.e., when developments in the social 
sphere create system problems which cannot be resolved 
by the capacity for control of the principle of or—  
ganization, new learning processes within the cultu­
ral sphere emerge which can be interpreted only by a 
model of "rational reconstruction". In this model, the 
evolution of norms obeys a specific "developmental lo­
gic" analogous to the logic of moral evolution in the 
Piaget-Kohlberg tradition.
"These structural patterns depict a developmental 
logic inherent in cultural traditions and insti­
tutional change. This logic says nothing about the 
mechanisms of development; it says something only 
about the range of variations within which cultu­
ral values, moral representations, norms and the 
like —  at a given level of social organization -- 
can be changed and can find different historical 
expression. In its developmental dynamics, the 
change of normative structures remains dependent 
on evolutionary challenges posed by unresolved, 
economically conditioned system problems and on 





























































































This interplay between the.logic and the dynamics of 
the development of norms can be seen in the following 
sequence of explanation (Habermas, 1976a:242; 1979d: 
161; 1981 ):
1. Initial State: The principle of organisation of a 
given historical period has the necessary capacity to 
solve the problems of social and system integration. 
Example: Political class structures of medieval feudal 
society were generally well^suited to agrarian oroduc- 
tion and urban artisanship.
2. Evolutionary Challenge: The social structure crea-
ites system problems which surpass the adapting: and 
learning capacity of society within the present orga­
nization principle. Example: Economic problems (inter­
national trade and monetary economy) cannot be dealt 
within the framework of the principle of organization 
of medieval politics.
3. Experimentation: Cognitive potentialities which 
have been developed autonomously in the cultural sphere 
according to its own developmental logic, are used
for social organization in an experimental manner. 
Example: Normative concepts are institutionalized as 
models for strategic action (the idea of the market or 
rational organization are instances of this).
4. Stabilization: When successful, the new organizatio­
nal principle is institutionalized throughout society 




























































































in particular. Example: The creation of a complemen­
tary relationship between the economy, the private 
law system, state taxation, and modern administration
What makes this concept of the "organizational prin­
ciple" useful for our purposes, is its focus on the 
relationship between legal and social structures. Fun 
damental legal norms —  seen as incorporating organi­
zational principles at an institutional level —  are 
analyzed in terms of an interplay between normative 
structures and broader social structures. Normative 
structures develop according to an autonomous evolu­
tionary logic which can be analyzed by rational re­
construction in a manner similar to Nonet and Selz- 
nick's concept of autonomous legal development. At 
the same time, the analysis is supplemented by a sys­
tem/ environment-model which shows the influence of 
the dynamics of social evolution. The crucial point 
is that both approaches are combined. It allows us to 
construct a more comprehensive model of socio-legal 
co-variation in the sense, " ... that in social evo­
lution higher levels of integration can only be es­
tablished insofar as legal institutions have emerged 
in which a moral consciousness of the conventional 
or post-conventional stage (Habermas) is embo­
died." In this respect Habermas has found a solution 




























































































in Nonet and Selznick's theory. The combination of 
two different analytical models enables him to ana­
lyze legal development both in terms of its autonomy 
and in terms of its social dependency.
Moreover, from this combination one gains a three- 
dimensional concept of legal rationality (which we 
have already used in our preliminary definition of 
reflexive law). Legal rationality can be analyzed 
in its normative, social and cognitive dimensions. 
"Rational reconstruction" leads to a concept of 
"norm rationality" which determines the possible 
norms and values within a given moral and legal or­
der. The "system/environment model" supplements 
this internal view with a concept of "system ratio­
nality" which determines the capacity of the legal 
order to respond to problems of control in society. 
Both norm rationality and system rationality in turn, 
determine the constraints on the internal conceptual, 
procedural and organizational structures of the le­
gal system. They define the "internal rationality" of 
legal concepts.
The question, however, of how societal organization 
principles are "translated" into legal structures, 
is left more or less open in Habermas' theory. Luh- 
mann's concept of the "socially adequate complexity" 




























































































By rejecting the key concepts of classical evolutio­
nism, and in particular those of unilinearity, neces­
sity, and progress, Luhmann develops a minimalist 
version of an evolutionary model. This involves three
basic assumptions concerning dynamics, mechanisms,
17and directionality . The dynamics of evolution de­
rive primarily from a fundamental difference in com­
plexity between system and environment:
"Evolution presupposes ... an overproduc­
tion of possibilities in regard to which 
systems can be selectively maintained by 
structures and, on theses premises, it ren­
ders probable otherwise improbable systems 
of order. Impulse and regulation of evolu­
tion is the complexity difference between 
system and environment" (Luhmann, 1972a:136).
This difference in complexity produces changes in 
the social systems which adapt if and insofar as they 
develop specific evolutionary mechanisms for varia­
tion, selection, and stabilization (Luhmann, 1975a:
15o). In the case of the legal system:
"The main source of overproduction of possi­
bilities is the normative, i .e.,the tempo­
ral dimension. The mechanism of institutiona­
lization serves as a selection factor which 
chooses among new expectations those for 
which consensus of third parties can be pre­
sumed. Stabilization is reached by linguis­
tic definition of a transferable meaning 
which can be worked into and preserved in 
the conceptual structure of law"
(Luhmann, 1972a:14o).
Socio-legal evolution, in Luhmann's account, is charac­
terized by the interplay between these "endogenous" evo 
lution mechanisms within the legal system and "exoge­
nous" evolution of the society at large (Luhmann, 197oa 
7; 1972a:132). Endogenous evolution is systematical­




























































































organization principles of society at large influen­
ce the relative effect of the endogenous evolution 
mechanisms. Law has to adapt to. specific levels of 
social differentiation. The dominant organization 
principle of society;(segmentation, stratification, 
functional differentiation creates particular confi­
gurations of the legal system with specific "bottle­
necks" of legal evolution (Luhmann, 197oa:16).
In segmented societies, which are characterized by a 
"poverty of alternatives", "archaic law" has its evo­
lutionary problems in providing for an adequate va­
riety of normative structures. Stratified societies 
possessing a diffentiated hierarchical order have 
solved this problem by producing a greater variety 
of norms; the resulting "law of pre-modern high cul­
ture", however, faces problems in the selection pro­
cedure of decisions. Finally, functionally differen­
tiated societies are characterized by a massive over­
production of norms; the corresponding " positive 
law" has developed sufficiently sophisticated selec­
tion mechanisms, particularly in legislative proce­
dures, but its stabilization mechanisms are still 
bound to traditional doctrinal concepts. It is this 
underdeveloped status of legal doctrine which pro­
duces the crisis of positive law (Luhmann, 1973:13o, 
142; 1974:49). Its rigid normative character hinders 
the emergence of a social adequate "learning".law.




























































































tual system oriented towards social policy which 
would permit one to compare the consequences of dif­
ferent solutions, to compare experiences from dif­
ferent fields, in short: to learn"(Luhmann, 197oa:19).
In order to test the explanatory power of these two 
concepts —  that of "organizational principles" and 
that of "adequate complexity" -- we will in an expe­
rimental manner combine them with Nonet and Selznick's 
concept of "internal legal dynamics", and spell out 
the consequences for each evolutionary stage of law. 
.Because of our particular concern with modern legal 
rationality, this can be done only briefly for "re­
pressive" and "autonomous" lav;, while the implications 
for "responsive" law will be analyzed in more detail.
3. Re-interpretation of Repressive and Autonomous 
Law
In Nonet and Selznick's theory, the initial stage of 
legal development is "repressive law" -- a legal or­
der whose main function is to provide legitimation for 
an emerging political order (1978:29). For Habermas as 
well as tor Luhmann, "repressive law" would represent 
a rather modern tyoe of leaal order, reflecting the 
social organization principles of an advanced "poli­
tical society" (Habermas, 1 978d:151; Luhmann, 1 972a: 
166). This•suggests that Nonet and .Selznick's typo­




























































































of legal order -- "archaic law"»— (Luhmann, 1972a:
145) the characteristics of which cannot be subsumed 
either under repressive, autonomous, or responsive 
law. In contrast to repressive law, archaic law re­
flects the organization principle of segmented so­
cieties which are charcterized by the predominance
1 8of kinship-relations(Luhmann, 1972a:145) . Retri­
bution and reciprocity are the main principles of 
archaic law which in various forms of sacred law de­
velops very concrete and rigid norms, has only ritua­
listic forms of procedure, and stresses expressive 
rather than instrumental functions (Luhmann, 1972a:
154). This primitive law will be transformed into 
"repressive law" only if and insofar as system problems 
emerge which surpass the control capacity of the kin­
ship organization principle and lead to the develop­
ment of a political organization (Habermas, 1979d:162).
It is with the emergence of a new social principle 
of organization (Luhmann: "stratification" (1 977a:33).- 
Habermas : "political class domination" (1979d)) that 
the legal structure needs to change its character. 
Nonet and Selznick analyze in detail the intimate con­
nections of political power and "repressive law"
(1 978:29) . This corresponds to Luhmann's account of 
"high cultural law", the structure of which reflects 
the supremacy of the political order in stratified 
societies and their hierarchical form of domination 




























































































analysis, is achieved by the institutionalization of 
court procedures which can cope with the much higher 
degree of social conflict in stratified societies 
(1 972a: 171) . Habermas' analysis of the organization 
principle in stratified societies focuses on the 
specific type of social integration which becomes 
possible under "political class domination". Through 
the institutionalization of court procedures, a con­
ventional morality can replace its preconventional 
predecessor:
"This was the case when the judge, instead of 
being bound as a mere referee to the contingent 
constellations of power of the involved parties, 
could judge according to inter-subjectively re­
cognized legal norms sanctified by tradition, 
when he took the intention of the agent into 
account as well as the concrete consequences of 
action, and when he was no longer guided by the 
ideas of reprisal for damages caused and resto­
ration of a status quo ante, but punished the 
guilty party's violation of a rule'.' (1 979d: 1 61) .
Again , the crisis of this type of law needs to be ana­
lyzed in terms of its socio-legal interrelations.
The interplay of both, an internal "legitimation 
crisis" of repressive law (Nonet and Selznick, 1978:
51) and an external "system crisis" (Habermas: eco­
nomic system problems (1976a:242); Luhmann: the 
emergence of functional differentiation (1972a:19o)), 
press for the development from repressive law to a 
more "autonomous" type of law.
"Autonomous law", in Nonet and Selznick's definition, 
fulfills the condition of formal legal rationality 




























































































litics, legal professionalization, strict rule-orien­
tation, universality and precision, "artificial rea­
soning", and procedural justice (1978:53; Rheinstein, 
1954:61,3o1). If one relates formal law, as Habermas 
suggests, to the dominant organization principle of 
modern societies, then law appears to obey a specific 
"system rationality" as well as specific "norm ratio­
nality" (1976a:262). Formal law contributes, on the 
one hand, to the mobilization and allocation of na­
tural resources by fulfilling the normative impera­
tives of a developed market-society. This is the system 
rationality of modern law which is facilitated by its 
characteristics of conventionality, legalism, and for­
mality. On the other hand, in its universalist ele­
ments, law begins to institutionalize a post-conven­
tional norm rationality, i.e. the necessity to justi­
fy norms by reasoning via universal principles. In a 
complementary fashion, it is possible to use Luhmann's 
analysis to demonstrate how "autonomous law" develops 
adequate complexity with respect to the principle of 
functional differentiation. In this perspective, the 
phenomenon of "positivity" and the separation of judi­
cial and legislative procedures appear to be the cru­
cial variables (Luhmann, 197ob:176; 1972a:19o). Simi­
larly to explain the crisis of this modern type of law, 
the internal dynamics resulting in pressure for in­
creased responsiveness (Nonet and Selznick, 1978:7o) 
need to be related to inadequacies of legal complexity 




























































































into crisis of the dominant organization principle 
(Habermas, 1976a:242).
Thus, this tentative re-formulation of "repressive" 
and "autonomous" law may have plausibly demonstrated 
the explanatory value of a synthesis approach. To com­
bine "organization principle" and "adequate social 
complexity" with the theory of "law and society in 
transition" means to considerably modify the encom­
passing model. In short, this approach compels us to 
supplement the threefold typology of legal evolution 
with an additional evolutionary stage —  "archaic 
law" —  and to give different assessments of "repres­
sive" and "autonomous" law in terms of external func­
tions and internal structures and in terms of their 
inherent crisis tendencies. However, the question more 
relevant for our present purpose needs still to be 
answered: How does this synthesis approach improve our 
understanding of "responsive law"?
V. "THE QUEST FOR RESPONSIVE LAW" : ADEQUATE SOCIAL 
COMPLEXITY?
To recapitulate our initial question was, what solu­
tions are offered in legal theory to cope with the 
present crisis of formal legal rationality? Nonet and 
Selznick, combining a "social science strategy" with 
an evolutionary approach, develop the concept of "res­




























































































two major dimensions: substantive and reflexive ra­
tionality (part I)-. The development model seems to be 
unsatisfactory, however, insofar as it does not suf­
ficiently account for interrelations between legal 
and social evolution. A more comprehensive model of 
socio-legal co-variation can be constructed by combi­
ning the analysis of "internal legal dynamics" (Nonet 
and Selznick) with concepts of the "external" rela­
tions of law and society namely Habermas' "social or­
ganization principle", Luhmann1s view of the "ade­
quate social complexity" of the law. In this context, 
"repressive" and "autonomous law" could be systema­
tically linked to corresponding developmental levels 
in theories of social evolution (part II). The resul­
ting question would be how to re-define "responsive 
law" in the light of socio-legal interrelations. What 
type of social "organization principle" does it res­
pond to? What elements in responsive law provide "ade­
quate social complexity"? If it is true that internal 
legal dynamics produce the potential for a substantive 
as well as for a reflexive rationality, how then is 
this potential realized in external socio-legal dyna­
mics?
To put these questions in a more amenable form, we will 
make use of concepts of post-modern society from Haber­
mas' as well as from Luhmann'theory. we will tnen ask 
how, in the light of these concepts, social structures 




























































































Certainly, Luhmann and Habermas, representing a major
controversy in macro-sociological theory, disagree
widely over the analysis of essential features of post- 
19modern society . But for our present purposes, at 
least, we can treat their theories as complementary, 
rather than as competing approaches. In the context 
of legal evolution both theorists focus on a common 
problem: How is normative integration possible in mo­
dern society which is characterized by disintegrating, 
even disruptive, conflicts between the different ra­
tionalities of highly specialized social subsystems?^0 
We can interpret their subsequent analyses as supple­
menting each other. On the one hand, Habermas' account 
of the tendency towards crisis in organized capitalism 
can be translated into the general framework of a 
systems theory which describes the inherent conflicts 
between the different rationalities of the political, 
economic, and cultural subsystems. On the other hand, 
the integrative mechanisms which Luhmann proposes for 
highly differentiated societies can be seen to be in­
cluded in Habermas' theory: they represent mechanisms 
of system integration which —  in Habermas' account —  
would need to be supplemented by mechanisms of social 
integration (Habermas, 19 75: 1 1 3) . This inclusion of 
both critical theory and neo-functionalism with en­
courage us to use the analytical potential of both 





























































































1. Substantive Legal Rationality in the Crisis of 
the Interventionist State
Habermas (1975) has developed a theory of the legiti­
mation problems within organized capitalism which can 
be systematically linked to the concept of responsive 
law. In essence, the theory argues that organized 
capitalism is characterized by a series of succes­
sive crises shifting between different social sub­
systems: Primary economic crises are partially re­
solved by state intervention, thus creating new cri­
sis phenomena within the political system; the emer­
ging political legitimation problems lead to a poli­
ticization of the cultural system; this in turn pro­
duces cultural crises which might be resolved only 
by fundamental changes in the normative structures 
(Habermas, 1975:33). Within this framework, the cri­
sis of formal legal rationality —  which Nonet and 
Selznick explain exclusively by internal institutio­
nal constraints and pressures in "autonomous law" —  
is closely connected to an external phenomenon: the 
emergence of modern state interventionism. The former 
system rationality in "autonomous law" which was achie­
ved in the interplay between a market-economy, a for­
mal private law system, state taxation and bureau­
cratic administration, is undermined, as the political 
system increasingly takes over the responsibility 
for correcting market-deficiencies, for global eco­
nomic policy, and for compensatory social policies 




























































































law" is the corollary development within the legal 
sphere. Law develops a substantive rationality which 
is characterized by particularism, result-orientation 
an instrumentalist social policy approach and a broa­
dening legalization of formerly autonomous social pro 
cesses (Bruggemeier et al., 1980:32,71; Unger, 1977: 
192; Eder, 1978).
So far, substantive rationality seems to possess a 
growing potential within a state-interventionist type 
of law. Habermas' point, however, is rather to demon­
strate the limits to its growth. In his account, 
three tendencies to crisis are seen to emerge within 
the political system and to limit drastically the 
potential of a political-legal substantive rationali­
ty. (1975:5o). A "rationality crisis" of state inter­
vention arises by virtue of the fact that the control 
capacity of the political system cannot cope with the 
contradictory imperatives of economic crisis manage­
ment. Eventually, this will pose threats to system
22integration and endanger social integration. . The 
complexity of socio-economic processes cannot be 
reflected in politico-legal control mechanisms and 
prevents a far-reaching substantive rationality of 
law and politics. Even more important is a second ten 
dency, a "legitimation crisis" in organized capita­
lism. Due to processes of economic concentration and 
state-interventionist policies, the market mechanism 




























































































rally" justified distributive outcomes. To the ex­
tent that state intervention takes over the political 
responsibility for market-substitution and market- 
compensation, the political system becomes increasing­
ly dependent on mass loyalty for its politico-econo­
mic decisions. The political production of legitimi­
zing ideologies is unable to provide a way out of this 
dilemma, because —  according to Habermas —  it is 
confronted by insurmountable limits by the resis­
tance of normative structures (1975:6 8) . The inherent 
"developmental logic" of the cultural system thus ne- 
cessarily__creates a "motivation crisis" which sets 
effective limits to the substantive rationality of the 
welfare state (Habermas, 1975:75).
In Habermas' view, only a "discursive" rationality 
emerging from autonomous evolution processes in the 
normative sphere could finally resolve the legitima­
tion problems of the modern state (1975:95). This view 
is based on a theory of political legitimation which 
asserts that due to irreversible developments in the 
normative sphere, modern principles of legitimation can­
not be anything but procedural: "Since ultimate grounds 
can no longer be made plausible, the formal conditions 
of justification themselves obtain legitimating force. 
The procedures and presuppositions of rational agree­
ment themselves become principles"(Habermas, 1976b:
184). According to Habermas, the subsequent question 




























































































organizational structures and which discussion and 
decision mechanisms can produce procedurally legi­
timate outcomes, depends on "concrete social and 
political conditions, on scopes of disposition, on 
information and so forth" (Habermas, 1 97 9b: 186) . His 
own proposals to institutionalize procedural legiti­
mation include the notion of "organizational democra­
cy" in labor unions, public associations, and func­
tional elites, participatory mechanisms in various 
social subsystems, mainly in the educational and cul­
tural sector, and a "pragmatistic dialogue model" for
an institutionalized cooperation between science, po-
1
litics and the public (Habermas, 1962:228,269; 1969: 
2o2; 19 7o : 62; 1 973 : 9) .
This program for the "democratization of social sub­
systems" shows strong similarities to Nonet and Selz- 
nick's concept of responsive law .A broader political 
participation in the legal process, and the institu - 
tional design of organizations representing various 
interests, are the corresponding elements (Nonet and 
Selznick, 1978:95; Selznick, 1969:243). The crucial 
point, however, is that this parallel holds true only 
for those elements in responsive law involving what 
we have called reflexive rationality. Habermas' ana­
lysis suggests the following conclusion: If we use 
the idea of responsive law to try to deal with legiti­
mation problems in post-modern society, we find its 




























































































In the dimension of substantive rationality, respon­
sive law encounters the limits to interventionism.
It suffers the various crises of the political system 
concerning the rationality of its control capacities 
as well as the public legitimation of its measures.
In the dimension of reflexive rationality, however, 
responsive law can institutionalize a procedural legi­
timacy which -- in Habermas' account -- may represent 
the dominant organizational principle of a post-mo­
dern society.
According to Habermas' distinction between .law as 
"medium” and law as "institution", procedural legiti­
macy requires a law which would not function as a so- 
cialtechnolcgical "medium" which contradicts the com­
municative structures of the "life-world". It would 
require a law as an "institution" which is restricted 
to the "external constitution" of the spheres of so­
cialization, social integration, and cultural repro­
duction. This type of law would not endanger but faci­
litate self-regulatory processes of communication and 
learning (Habermas, 1981).
2. Reflexive Legal Rationality in Functionally Dif­
ferentiated Societies.
So far, we have examined the concept of responsive law 
in the context of "critical theory". If we translate 
our problem into-the language of neo-functionalist 




























































































Parsons tradition, we will find that the same groups 
of problems reappear —  although in a more abstract 
and more comprehensive perspective. "Crisis tenden­
cies in organized capitalism" are now interpreted as 
particular cases of a more general phenomenon. It is 
the very functional differentiation of society, which 
induces highly specialized subsystems to develop their
own specific rationality to such an extreme degree that
23radical system conflicts are inevitable. "Motivation 
crisis" —  in Habermas' terms the contemporary Grund- 
widerspruch between the logic of state-interventionism 
and the logic of cultural development —  now appears 
as rather marginal amongst a whole variety of equally 
or even more fundamental conflicts: universal social 
structures (economy, science) versus territorially 
bound political and legal structures, scientific plan­
ning versus economic production control, temporal 
requirements of social interdependencies versus slow- 
developing processes of education and institutionali­
zation (Luhmann, 1971:374). Finally, the quest for 
responsive law, emerging from a crisis of formal le­
gal rationality, is now seen in the context of one 
overriding problem: How does the legal system parti­
cipate in and react to the secular processes of func­
tional differentiation? (Luhmann, 197oa; 1972a:19o).
In this perspective, Max Weber's description of modern 



























































































the concepts of form and substance are almost inter­
changeable in the comparison between traditional and 
modern law (Luhmann, 1972a:17). Rather, the notion of 
"autonomous law" in Nonet and Selznick's sense points
to the crucial changes of functional differentiation: 
increasing autonomy of the legal system, its separa­
tion from moral and scientific structures, and its re­
lative independence from political processes. It is 
in these developments that the features of legal for­
malism emerge: strict rule-orientation, professional 
"artificial reasoning", prominence of procedure (Luh­
mann, 1972b:2o7). And the "crisis" of autonomous law 
is explained by this very phenomenon: law, particularly 
in its conceptual structures, has not yet adapted to 
the exigencies of a highly differentiated society. Le­
gal doctrine is still bound to the classical "law 
application model" in the judicial perspective and 
has not developed yet a conceptual apparatus adequate 
for planning and social policy requirements in the 
interrelations between specialized social subsystems 
(Luhmann, 1972b: 325).
"Substantive legal rationality" in Max Weber's sense, 
which "solves" the crisis by a re-moralization and 
re-politization of law, appears then as a clearly re­
gressive tendency. A renewed fusion of the law with 
the scientific, moral, and political sphere, would de­
stroy the specific juridical rationality without re­
placing it by a new one (Luhmann, 1974:31). In Luh­
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f V
V *milar to Habermas' -- a thoroughgoing "re-materiali­
zation" of law would inevitably lead to a rationality 
crisis of the political-legal system. In the proces­
ses of functional differentiation, social subsystems 
have developed such a high degree of internal complex­
ity that none of these subsystems —  neither politics, 
science, economy, morals, law, nor any re-combination 
of them —  could evolve the necessary control capacity. 
Thus, responsive law in its substantive dimension, if 
it were to become the dominant feature of law, would 
result in a regressive de-differentiation of society, 
rather than its re-integration.
Thus, the central question emerges: How is integration 
possible under conditions of extreme functional dif­
ferentiation? (Wille, 1978:228; Turner, 1974:379). 
Luhmann's answer differs considerably from Durkheim's
Ireliance on "organic solidarity" which is expressed in 
"restitutive law" (Durkheim, 1933:111). In Luhmann's 
judgment, organic solidarity still does represent a 
traditional mechanism since it counts on norms and va­
lues which are common to all subsystems, if highly 
generalized. However, for subsystems radically dif­
fering from each other, in external functions and in­
ternal rationalities, integration cannot be achieved 
by a(political-legal) prescription of uniform norma­
tive structures. As Luhmann puts it: "Under conditions 
of increasing complexity, society can less and less 




























































































cording to uniform structures ... Rather, integration 
must be achieved so that all subsystems mutually pro­
vide intrasocietal environments for each other" (Luh- 
mann, 1977b:243). It follows"... that they have to 
fulfill adequately not only their own function, but to 
stand in a meaningful relation of compatibility to the 
functions and structural achievements of other systems 
for which they form an environment" (Luhmann, 1974:88). 
Functional differentiation requires a displacement of 
integrative mechanisms from the level of the society 
to the level of the subsystems (Luhmann, 1974 :88) . Cen­
tralized social integration by political mechanisms —  
as was achieved in stratified societies —  is effective­
ly ruled out today and cannot be replaced by legal, eco­
nomic, moral or scientific mechanisms. If integration 
under modern conditions means to avoid the maximization 
of the rationality of one subsystem leading to non- 
solvable problems in other functional systems, then a 
decentralized mode of integration is inevitable. "Cor­
responding restrictions must be built-in into the re­
flexion structure of every functional subsystem, insofar 
as they do not result directly from ongoing relations 
with its environment" (Luhmann, 1977b:245). Thus, "re­
flexion" structures seem to be the key to our question 
of how to determine the integrative role of responsive 
law in functionally differentiated societies. This needs 
some clarification.
"Intra-subsystem reflexion" is supposed to replace so­




























































































functional differentiation, insofar as subsystems 
develop contradicting orientations that can only be 
harmonized internally (Luhmann, 1977b:54). In Luh- 
mann's theory, each subsystem can orient its selective 
operations towards three different system references: 
(1) towards the system of society in terms of its 
function; (2) towards other subsystems within the in­
ternal environment of the society in terms of input 
and output performances; and (3) towards itself in 
terms of reflexion (Luhmann, 1 977a:36) . The crucial 
point is that these orientations collide with each 
other and cannot be subsumed under a common purpose.
In the political system, for instance, there is an 
inherent tension between its social function (formu­
lation and execution of binding decisions) and its 
performance (care for power resources and for suffi-. 
cient legitimation) which can be reconciled only in­
ternally by processes of political reflexion (focu­
sing on its historical identity) (Luhmann, 1977a:38). 
In the same fashion,it is the job of reflexion struc­
tures in any social subsystem to resolve the conflict 
between function and performance by imposing inter­
nal restrictions on the capacities of the system "in 
the interest of being suitable as components of the 
environment of other subsystems"(Luhmann, 1977b:245). 
"Reflexion must mediate between performance and func­
tion, since for the subsystem, society represents the
Itencompassing system as well as the social environment 




























































































function and performance, reflexion structures with­
in social subsystems become the main integrating me­
chanisms in functionally differentiated societies. 
Turning to responsive law again, we come to the con­
clusion that, viewed from this theoretical perspec­
tive, law needs to develop "reflexive dimensions" if
24it is supposed to work as integrative mechanism
3. The Point of Convergence; Internal Reflexion and 
Discursive Democracy in Social Subsystems
It is precisely in the "reflexive" dimension of res­
ponsive law that we see a point of convergence bet­
ween the theoretical approaches we have analyzed so 
far. Our translation of responsive law into the lang­
uages of neo-functionalism and critical theory has 
led us to a sceptical assessment of substantive le­
gal rationality under modern conditions. In addition, 
in our interpretation of Nonet and Selznick's theory, 
we can trace a systematical connection between Haber­
mas' procedural concept of legitimation and Luhmann's 
thoery of internal system reflexion. Our thesis is:
On the one hand, reflexion within social sub-system 
becomes possible, only insofar as democratization pro­
cesses create discursive structures within these sub­
systems. On the other hand, the primary function of 
democratization of social sub-systems lies neither in 
increasing individual participation nor in neutrali­
zing power structures but in an internal reflexion of 




























































































structures might play an important role. Two comple­
mentary perspectives on reflexive law are available: 
While the neo-functionalist approach leads us to a new 
self-limitation of the legal order, critical theory 
points to the main potential of reflexive legal struc­
tures —  furthering internal democratic processes in 
social subsystems.
What this new legal self-limitation means, can be seen 
more clearly, if one applies the abovementioned three­
fold typology to the legal system itself: function, 
performance,reflexion. The function of law can be de­
fined as its capacity to provide congruent generaliza­
tions of expectations for the whole of society (Luh- 
mann, 1972a:94). Its performance is to resolve con­
flicts which are produced in other social subsystems 
and which cannot be resolved there. Both orientations 
overlap, but at the same time they tend to conflict. 
The production of congruent normative generalizations 
may not suffice to provide rules which are suited to 
resolve concrete conflicts. Seen the other way around, 
the legal system, by the processes of conflict-resolu­
tion, may produce norms which, are not congruently ge-
neralizable. It is the role of legal reflexion to re­
concile the inherent tentions between function and 
performance by imposing internal restrictions on the 
capacities of the legal system.
It is our thesis, that under modern conditions, this 




























































































comprehensive regulation in terms of substantive 
legal rationality, legal reflexion would restrict' 
legal performance to more indirect, more abstract 
forms of social control.
The crucial point is the structural correspondence 
between legal norms and the opportunity structure with­
in social subsystems. Substantive legal rationality 
does not take sufficient account of this necessary 
correspondence. It attempts to regulate social struc­
tures by legal norms, even though these structures 
do not bend to legal regulation.
-  • • I
Aspects of the educational system and the social se­
curity system provide striking examples. In these 
fields, the current critique of legalization has shown 
again and again that material legal programmes obey 
a functional logic, and follow criteria of rationa­
lity and patterns of organization which are not ade­
quate to the internal social structure of the regulated 
spheres of life. The consequences are ambivalent. Eithe 
law as a medium of the welfare state turns out to be 
ineffective or it works effectively but at the price 
•of destroying traditional patterns of social life 
(Habermas 1981).
In contrast, a reflexive orientation would attempt to 
correct this deficiency by scrutinizing the chances 
of effectiveness of legal regulation. The guiding 
question cannot be any longer: Are there social prob­




























































































Are there social problems which represent a realistic 
opportunity structure for legal regulation and which 
at the same time would not irreversibly destroy accep­
ted patterns of social life?
What could be the result of such a legal self-restric­
tion? Can we plausible hypothesize the way in which 
an autonomous reflexion would define the role of law 
vis-a-vis other social subsystems? The result of legal 
self-reflexion need not necessarily be a policy of 
de-regulation, de-formalization of substantive— law-!----
Rather it would be a legal self-restraint to provide 
structural premises for self-regulation within other 
social subsystems. This means not only to legally.gua­
rantee autonomy for other social subsystems. These gua­
rantees are important, but they do not exhaust the po­
tential of reflexive law. It is rather Habermas' con­
cept of "democratization of social subsystems" which 
—  with its stress on procedural legitimation —  shows 
the direction in which legal reflexion could develop.
In his critique of legalization in the welfare state 
Habermas has introduced the important distinction bet­
ween law as "medium" and law as "institution". While 
law as a technological "medium" of societal guidance 
endangers the communicative structures of the legalized 
spheres of social life, law as an "institution" which 
draws on the moral sources of a given society may even 
facilitate communicative processes if it is restricted 
to the "external constitution" of the communicatively 




























































































tution" enables procedures of conflict regulation 
which are adequate to the structures of communicative 
interaction: "... discursive decision processes and 
consensus oriented procedures of negotiation and de­
cision". If we use Habermas' notion of procedural 
legitimacy which can be reached by the installation 
of "discursive" structures within different subsystems 
of society, then the contribution of legal norms be­
comes apparent. The legal system can provide norms of 
procedure, organization and competences which would 
enable other social systems to achieve self-organiza­
tion and self-regulation. Instead of authoritatively 
determining social functions of other subsystems, and 
instead of regulating their input and output perfor­
mances, law must turn its attention to mechanisms 
which systematically further the development of re­
flexion structures within other social subsystems.
The crucial point is .differentiation.lt seems neces­
sary to develop a theory of discourse which allows 
for specification according to the specific rationali­
ties of social sub-systems. In the light of functio­
nal differentiation, it no longer makes sense to hope 
for universal legitimation structures, for a general­
ly applicable morality of discourse, for a common 
procedure of reflexion. To generalize the seminar- 
model of scientific discourse and to apply it to legal, 
political, and economic systems fails to take account 




























































































the requirements of a theory of argumentation. Con­
sequently, legal prerequisistes for reflexion proces­
ses in the economy or in politics differ greatly from 
those for the educational system.
The law would restrict itself to the sub-system- 
specific installation, correction and re-definition 
of democratic self-regulatory mechanisms instead of 
taking over responsibility for the outcome of the so­
cial processes themselves. The formal mechanisms
applied would be ''reflexive” in the sense of applying
25processes to themselves: Instead of determining the
factual decision itself, it would decide about deci­
sions, would regulate regulations, would define struc­
tural premises for decisions to be made in the future 
in terms of organization, procedure and competencies.
In short, our thesis is: Law realizes its own reflexive 
orientation insofar as it provides structural premi­
ses for reflexive processes in other social subsystems. 
That is what we mean by the integrative function of
a contemporary responsive law.
4. A New Legal Self-Restraint: Developmental Chances 
in Modern.Private Law
To be sure, the"result” we have reached so far is mere­
ly hypothetical in nature. That responsive law develops 
potentialities for a substantive and a reflexive ra­
tionality, and that this potential is differentially 




























































































is nothing more than a hypothesis derived from theo­
ries of socio-legal development. Selectively exploi­
ting "internal" variables (from the theory of respon­
sive law) and "external" variables (from theories of 
post-modern society in critical theory and neo-func­
tionalism) , we have sketched a model of socio-legal 
interrelations and have arrived at the proposition 
that responsive law can respond to the challenges of 
post-modern society if it succeeds in developing a "re 
flexive" legal rationality. It 'is beyond any doubt 
that this hypothesis which builds on highly specula­
tive (and debatable) theoretical assumptions, needs 
to undergo strong empirical testing before it might 
claim any "validity". However, we might lend some em­
pirical support to our thesis to point to some recent 
legal trends in which we recognize developmental chan­
ces for "reflexive" legal structures, although we have 
to acknowledge that the "fallacy of misplaced con­
creteness" is almost inevitable.
Consider again the development of contract law. The 
well-known movement of "socialization of contract" by 
"public control over terms" obviously expresses trends 
towards substantive legal rationality (Friedman , 1959 
9o,1o6) . Legislative definitions of minimal conditions 
and judicial control of the substantive agreement are 
the main features of materialization of contract law.
If this movement is to become more than some marginal 




























































































2 6limits of the legal system are clearly visible today 
Labor law, in contrast, has invented to some degree 
a more abstract control technique in the field of 
collective bargaining in which we can recognize a "re­
flexive" potential. Without much control of specific 
content, state law regulates collective bargaining on­
ly indirectly by shaping the organization of collective 
bargaining, defining procedural norms, limiting or 
expanding the competencies of the collective actors. 
Thus, law attempts to balance their bargaining power, 
thereby controlling only indirectly specific results. 
Even more interesting than this rearrangement of so­
cial power through law are legal strategies to streng­
then the "social responsibility" of the industrial 
conflict system. To be sure, it would be a legalistic 
naivete to prescribe explicit norms of'public respon­
sibility" either for the bargaining units or for the 
collective agreements as such. However, an effective 
facilitization of "reflexion" mechanisms might be 
expected from the legal regulation of organizational 
size and organizational structures. Comparative stu­
dies give some empirical support for the supposition 
that society-wide effects tend to be "reflected" to 
a considerably higher degree within the decision pro­
cess of collective agreements, e . g . if labor law systema­
tically favors a centralized "industrial union system" 
instead of a decentralized "shop steward" system with 
purely profession-oriented labor unions (Streeck et al, 




























































































To be sure, collective labor law cannot provide an 
example with universal application in contract law. 
Corresponding efforts at constructing a system of 
countervailing powers have shown a rather low deve­
lopmental potential, particularly in consumer pro­
tection law (Hart and Joerges, 198o: 83). However, 
functional parallels might be found in the "artifi­
cial” creation of autonomous semi-public institutions 
(e.g . "Stiftung-Warentest"or"Verbraucher2entrale") 
which provide comsumer information and political- 
legal representation for non-organized social inte­
rests (Hart and Joerges, 198o) . Again, the role of 
state law, in this respect, is not substantive regu­
lation but procedural and organizational structuring 
of "autonomous" social processes. 3y virtue of orga­
nizational norms, the law forces specialized one-sided 
social institutions to take contradictory requirements 
of environmental social systems into account. With 
such an orientation "... the law would not authorita­
tively decide what constitutes the consumer's inte­
rest; it could restrict itself to define competences 
for the articulation of consumer interests and to se­
cure their representation. It would neither be the 
task of the legal system to develop its own purpo­
sive programs, nor to decide goal conflicts between 
competing policies; it could restrict itself to gua­





























































































Obviously, consumer law is a good example to point to 
the limits of the strategy we have called "external 
decentralization". This strategy necessarily fails 
if social asymmetries of power and information prove' 
to be resistant against institutional attempts at 
equalization. Is it feassible that the law develops 
in itself "reflexive" structures which could compen­
sate for inequality of power and information? Admit­
tedly, it seems somewhat speculative to presume that 
certain legal structures - the so-called "general 
clauses" or "standards" -- possess a developmental po­
tential in this direction. Consider, however, stan­
dards of "good faith" or "public policy". Usually they 
are regarded as serving as the main instruments of ju­
dicial interventionism in the sense of materialization 
of formal law. An alternative interpretation would 
look at them as means of "socialization of contract" 
quite different from the traditional meaning of state 
intervention. It means to use the "standards" to co­
ordinate the dependencies of contractual norms from 
various social guidance mechanisms, the famous noncon­
tractual elements of contract. Various levels of so­
cial organization demand different, even contradic­
tory normative expectations from the contractual re­
lation: the level of concrete interaction between the 
contractual partners, the level of market and organi­
zation, the societal level of the interplay between 
politics, economics, culture, law. To integrate these 




























































































faith clause. Such a procedure is "reflexive" inso­
far as the legal system itself "simulates" social 
self-regulating processes. That means on the level 
of interaction: In case of "interaction deficiencies" 
objective purposes and duties are defined authori­
tatively by virtue of law. On the institutional le­
vel: In case of "market deficiencies", commercial 
customs are replaced by the judicial definition of 
market behavior rules. On the societal level: In 
case of "political deficiencies", the judicial pro­
cess defines standards of public policy. What these 
examples have in common is the logic of internal simu­
lation. A deficiency of self-regulating mechanisms 
in the real world is presumed, and the general clause 
of " good faith" or "public policy" is interpreted 
as a command to simulate internally self-regulatory 
processes. Obviously, such a simulation has its own 
deficiencies. It can be perverted easily into a 
sheer moralistic appeal to the "reasonable man".
And it is an open question if the quality of such si­
mulation. models can be increased in its cognitive 
and procedural aspects .
The law of private corporations may serve as a fur­
ther example. Here again we find tendencies to " sub­
stantialize" the formal classical- liberal corpora­
tion law which was restricted to provide political­
ly neutral forms for pivate associations. Today, ju­




























































































behavior seem to reach the limits of their control 
27capacity . Our approach would guide us to search 
in quite different directions: to design legal struc­
tures which systematically strenghten "reflexion me­
chanisms" within the economic system. "Constitutiona­
lization" of the private corporation might make the 
"corporate conscience" work if that means to force 
the organization to "internalize" outside conflicts 
into the very decision structure in order to take 
account of non-economic interests of workers, con­
sumers, and the general public. Is it totally implau­
sible that economic goal structures which have alrea­
dy undergone considerable change from profit-orien­
tation to growth-orientation might change again by 
taking into account problems of ecological balance 
(Luhmann, 1 977a: 39)"? Could this not even be the point 
where the law begins: "reflexive" control of corpo­
rate behavior (Stone, 1975) —  by transforming exter­
nal social troubles into internal political issues?
In this context, "democratization of social institu­
tions" transforms its traditional meaning. The main 
goal is neither power-equalization nor an increase of
individual participation in the emphatic sense of
2 8" participatory democracy" . Rather it is the deli­
berate design of organizational structures which 
make the institutions —  corporations, semi-public 
associations, mass media, educational institutions -- 




























































































the internal rationality. Its main function is to
substitute outside interventionist control by an
29effective internal control structure . To design 
structural preconditions for an "organizational con­
science" which would reflect the balance between 
its social functions and its environmental perfor­
mances —  this-would determine the integrative role 
of responsive law.
5. Some Implications for "Sociological Jurisprudence" 
Legal Constructions of Social Reality.
These examples may have illustrated what it means for 
the law to orient its structures toward a reflexive 
rationality. Further questions arise concerning the 
"cognitive competence" of a reflexive legal system, 
an issue of importance in the theory of "responsive 
law" (Nonet and Selznick, 1978:78,104,112). This is 
a field where future research is needed. Here, it is 
only possible to sketch the lines of argumentation 
which needs to be developed in depth. If it is true 
that legal reflexion processes contribute to social 
integration insofar as they mediate between perfor­
mance and function within the legal system, the struc 
tural conditions of this legal self-reflexion, par­
ticularly in their cognitive aspects, become of cru­
cial importance. Among these conditions, "internal 
models of reality" play a central role. The relevance 
of such models —  containing descriptive as well as 




























































































has been increasingly acknowledged in decision theory
4 oas well as in legal theory . Dworkin, for instance, 
has developed the thesis that in the interaction of 
norms and principles, the judge utilizes —  implicitly 
or explicitly —  "political theories"in order to justi­
fy the decision of "hard cases" (Dworkin, 19 77 :81 ,9o) . 
More generally, one can reconstruct certain "theories" 
of social reality out of legal norms, court opinions, 
and doctrinal considerations, which in turn serve as 
a kind of background information, —  to use the herme­
neutical phrase —  a "pre-understanding" ("Vorverstand- 
nis")to guide an orient legal decisions (Esser, 197o). 
Legal models of contract, of association, of state-so­
ciety relations, for instance, belong to these speci­
fically legal perceptions of social reality which dif­
fer significantly from our day-to-day understanding 
of these phenomena as well as from sociological or 
economic theories. The differences are due to social 
context: In order to decide social conflicts under 
the guidance of legal norms, the legal system has to 
develop certain specific "social constructions of re­
ality" in the strict sense of the word (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). From the perspective of legal con­
flict resolution, the law literally creates its own 
reality by abstracting highly selective models of the 
world thereby neglecting many of its politically, eco­




























































































Obviously, these models change their character in the 
course of legal development, and there will be a co­
variation between legal model construction and types 
of legal rationality. If "re-materialization" has 
forced formal law to change its perceptions of so­
cial reality, what kind of legal model-building then 
would be required by reflexive legal rationality?
"Sociological Jurisprudence" and related movements 
in legal theory (Freirechtsschule, Interessenjuris- 
prudenz) should be interpreted as methodological co­
rollaries of the re-materialization of formal law 
(Pound, 191o/11:591; 1 9 1 1~/12 :1 4o, 489 ; 1943/44, 1; 
Heck, 1968) . They attack legal formalism, not mere­
ly for its. conceptualism, as a reading of their cri­
ticisms of "mechanical jurisprudence" might suggest, 
but for its very construction of social reality.
While formal legal rationality had relied on auto­
nomous legal conceptualization of the world, asser­
ting that taking account of social , economic and po­
litical aspects was not a task for the "lawyer as 
such", substantive legal rationality has required a 
"re-scientification" of legal perceptions of reality. 
Precisely in what sense is the main methodological 
concern of sociological jurisprudence. ̂
This type of sociological jurisprudence, however, is 
bound to the crisis of substantive legal rationality 




























































































tionalism and critical theory. If taken seriously 
such a sociological jurisprudence requires encompas­
sing models of reality which have to integrate social 
science theories to such a degree that the law can 
take over responsibility for comprehensive planning 
processes. Legal analysis then tends to be transformed 
into a fully-fledged social policy analysis ranging 
from an adequate description of the real situation, 
over the perception of problems, the definition of
goals, the selection of legal norms, to the implemen-
3 2tation of norms in social reality . Obviously, the 
complexity required for such legal models —  if it 
were to accomlish this successfully —  will rapidly 
surpass the cognitive competence of any existing le­
gal system even if based on a profound interdiscipli­
nary analysis (Luhmann, 1974:31).
It seems that sociological jurisprudence needs —  in a 
manner quite similar to what has happened in decision 
theory —  to develop a concept of "bounded rationality" 
in order to construct workable models of reality, which 
are of practical use for legal decision processes (Si­
mon, 1976; March and Simon, 1966). Again it might be 
The very role of reflexion processes in the legal sys­
tem to define a new legal self-restraint , but now in 
the context of legal model-building. Reflexive legal 
rationality requires the legal system to view itself 
as a system-in-an-environment, (Luhmann, 1979: 161; 
Assmann, 198o:333) to take account of its own limited 




























































































performances of other social suh-systems. Thus, its
relation to social science knowledge is characterized
neither by "reception" nor by "separation". Rather
it is "translation" of social knowledge from one
social context to the other according to certain
translation rules, i.especific legal criteria of 
33selectivity . If it is true that law fulfills its 
integrative function by furthering reflexion proces­
ses in other social subsystems then the social 
knowledge required is very specific and the model 
constructions needed are much more limited than they 
would be in a comprehensive "planning" law. Reflexive 
law would have to utilize and to develop social know­
ledge of how to control self-regulatory processes in 
different contexts. Encompassing social policy mo­
dels would be replaced by models of how to combine 
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